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THE BURQA BAN: AN UNREASONABLE LIMITATION ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OR A JUSTIFIABLE RESTRICTION?
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2011, France enacted a law banning the concealment of the
face in public spaces (the “burqa ban”). The burqa ban creates two new
punishable offenses in France.1 First, wearing clothing designed to conceal
one’s face in a public space is punishable by either a maximum of a €150 fine
or by being required to take a class on the meaning of citizenship, or both.2
Second, forcing a woman to wear a face-covering veil is punishable by one
year of imprisonment or a €30,000 fine.3 The burqa ban, which was first
introduced by the French National Assembly4 and passed “overwhelmingly”
through both houses of the French Parliament,5 went into effect in France on
April 11, 2011.6
On its face, the burqa ban is a neutral provision; it refrains from mentioning
any specific religion or community, and its main concerns are the promotion of
gender equality and women’s rights, and the protection of national security.7
1 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law
2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010 Banning the Concealment of the Face in the Public Space] arts. 2–4, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 1.
2 Id. art. 3; see also CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 131-13. The law defines “public space” broadly to
include public roads and spaces that are open to the public. Loi 2010-1192 art. 2.
3 Loi 2010-1192 art. 4. If a man forces a minor to wear a face-covering veil, the possible fine is
increased to €60,000. Id.
4 Projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Bill Banning the Concealment
of the Face in the Public Space], Assemblée Nationale No. 2520 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Assemblée
Nationale No. 2520], available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/projets/pl2520.pdf.
5 CNN Wire Staff, French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, CNN (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:17 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/index.html [hereinafter French Senate Approves Burqa
Ban]; see also France Votes To Ban Full-Face Veils, AMNESTY INT’L (July 13, 2010), http://www.amnesty.
org/en/news-and-updates/france-votes-ban-full-face-veils-2010-07-13.
6 Steven Erlanger, French Legislation Takes Effect Banning Full-Face Coverings, N.Y. TIMES, April 12,
2011, at A4; Loi 2010-1192 art. 5.
7 Loi 2010-1192 arts. 1–4; Assemblé Nationale No. 2520, supra note 4, at 3–5; Jean-François Copé, OpEd., Tearing Away the Veil, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A31. While this Comment does not explore this
justification, the veil’s hindrance upon social interaction has also been used as a justification for the
prohibition. Copé, supra. Jean-François Copé described the veil as “an insurmountable obstacle to the
affirmation of a political community that unites citizens without regard to differences in sex, origin or religious
faith.” Id. He further went on to question how one can “establish a relationship with a person who, by hiding a
smile or a glance—those universal signs of our common humanity—refuses to exist in the eyes of others?” Id.
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However, it is common knowledge that the ban is aimed at eliminating the
burqas, niqabs, and sitars, worn almost exclusively by Muslim women, from
the French public sphere.8 While this prohibition directly affects only a small
portion of France’s population,9 the burqa ban has elicited protests within
France10 and has sparked a heated debate throughout the world: is the burqa
ban a discriminatory and unreasonable limitation on freedom of religion or a
justifiable restriction in a secular society, concerned with public safety and
gender equality?
In considering this issue, it is important to note the existence of several
competing factors:
[A]ny truly satisfactory approach to this issue must be able to
embrace a series of dualities. These include the simultaneous
importance of freedom of religion and gender equality, the
interrelationship and yet crucial distinction between freedom of
conscience and expression of that conscience, concern for the rights
of women seeking to express themselves by wearing headscarves and
for those of other women in the same context, coercion and agency,
the religious meanings of the veil and its political meanings,
discomfort with veiling and discomfort with restrictions on veils.
Only by weighing all of these factors and contradictions in context
11
can one begin to discover an adequate response to this problem.

In other words, to consider whether the burqa ban infringes on the rights of
the women who wear them, one must weigh several competing factors. While
the ban implicates important concerns regarding the restriction of freedom of
expression, many members of Western populations feel extreme discomfort in
reaction to the veil.12 Similarly, while the ban implicates important freedom of
religion concerns, many argue that, because Islam does not even prescribe the

8 See Benjamin Ismail, Ban the Burqa? France Votes Yes, MIDDLE E.Q., Fall 2010, at 47, 51–52;
France Sets Up Burka Commission, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8114590.stm (last updated
June 23, 2010, 10:48 AM). See generally France: Highlights of Parliamentary Report on the Wearing of the
Full Veil (BURQA), LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/law/help/france-veil.php (last updated Apr. 4,
2011) [hereinafter Highlights of Parliamentary Report] (discussing the Parliamentary Commission report on
the burqa in France).
9 Erlanger, supra note 6 (noting that approximately 2,000 women in France, out of an estimated Muslim
population of six million, wear face-covering veils).
10 See, e.g., France’s Controversial Burqa Ban Takes Effect, CNN (Apr. 10, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://
religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/10/french-police-arrest-burqa-ban-protesters.
11 Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious
Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 386 (2007).
12 See id. at 369–77.
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practice of wearing the veil, a ban on wearing the veil does not infringe upon
anyone’s religious freedom.13
Finally, the burqa ban implicates discrimination concerns on many fronts,
all of which are prohibited by Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights14 (“European Convention”). Article 14 forbids “discrimination
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.”15 The burqa ban potentially violates this article;
by prohibiting women from wearing face-covering veils, the burqa ban
discriminates against France’s Muslim population. However, France may also
violate Article 14 if it does not ban the veil; by allowing people to wear facecovering veils in French public spaces, France would possibly be condoning a
symbol of the inequality of women and gender discrimination.16
While this Comment considers all these factors, it argues that the burqa ban
is an unjustifiable restriction upon the fundamental freedom of religion
guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention.17 This Comment focuses
on Article 9, rather than on French constitutional law, for two reasons. First, a
French constitutional analysis of the burqa ban is virtually moot, as the French
Conseil Constitutionnel (“Constitutional Council”) has already decided that the
burqa ban is compatible with the French Constitution,18 and a ruling by the
Constitutional Council cannot be overcome easily.19 Second, an Article 9
13

Id. at 388–91.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Apr.
11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
15 Id. art 14.
16 See Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8. The French Parliamentary Commission,
comprised to study the wearing of the full veil in France, concluded that “[t]he full veil is the symbol of
subservience, the ambulatory expression of a denial of liberty that touches a specific category of the
population: women. In this it also constitutes a negation of the principle of equality.” Id. (translating Rapport
d’Information au Nom de la Mission d’Information sur la Pratique du Port du Voile Intégral sur le Territoire
National [Report of the Commission on the Practice of Wearing the Full Veil in France], Assemblée Nationale
Rapport No. 2262, at 107 (Jan. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Rapport No. 2262], available at http://www.assembleenationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i2262.pdf).
17 When a case regarding the burqa ban is heard by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), the
court will likely also analyze whether the ban complies with Article 14 of the European Convention. However,
this Comment focuses on the ban’s infringement on religious liberties, and thus analyzes the ban in accordance
with Article 9 of the European Convention, rather than Article 14.
18 Pierre-Antoine Souchard, France’s Constitutional Panel OKs Burqa Ban, MSNBC (Oct. 7, 2010, 2:00
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39559671.
19 Eilsa T. Beller, The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’État on the Role of Religion and Culture in
French Society, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 581, 603 (2004) (noting that a ruling by the Constitutional Council can only
be overruled by amending the constitution).
14
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analysis of the burqa ban is increasingly important in Europe, as several other
parties to the European Convention are considering legislation similar to the
French burqa ban.20 These European countries would be less inclined to pass
versions of the burqa ban if the French burqa ban does not comply with
Article 9.
Article 9 of the European Convention grants freedom of religion to all
European citizens by stating that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.”21 Yet, through Subsection 2, Article 9 also allows
for limitations where they are justified.22 According to Subsection 2,
interferences with religious freedom are justified in cases where the limiting
policy is prescribed by law, in pursuit of legitimate aims, and necessary in a
democratic society.23 The ECHR, the principal body that interprets the
European Convention, rarely strikes down legislation based on whether the
limitation at issue is prescribed by law or in pursuit of a legitimate aim,24 so
this Comment does not focus heavily on either of the two limitation clause
requirements. Instead, in asserting that the burqa ban is an unjustifiable limit
on French Muslims’ freedom of religion, this Comment focuses on the third
limitation requirement: whether the burqa ban is necessary in a democratic
society.
Part I of this Comment analyzes the background to the burqa ban—the
significance of the veil in Islam, the bill’s legal history, the French ideal of
laïcité, and France’s relationship with its Muslim population. Part II of this
Comment then lays a framework for an ECHR analysis. Part III of this
Comment follows an ECHR analysis of Article 9: (1) whether the ban
interferes with freedom of religion; (2) whether the ban is proportionate to its
legitimate aims; and (3) whether a margin of appreciation should be accorded
20

See discussion, infra Part I.B.
European Convention, supra note 14, art. 9(1).
22 Id. art 9(2). The European Convention is not alone in recognizing that limitations may be justifiably
placed on citizens’ right to freedom of religion. Rather, “all legal systems presume that States legitimately may
limit the exercise of protected rights under certain circumstances.” T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing
Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 465, 469 (2005).
23 European Convention, supra note 14, art. 9(2).
24 Jilan Kamal, Comment, Justified Interference with Religious Freedom: The European Court of Human
Rights and the Need for Mediating Doctrine Under Article 9(2), 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 667, 672
(2008).
21
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to France to justify the ban. Finally, Part IV of this Comment concludes that,
while the promotion of gender equality and safety are both legitimate aims for
an interference with religious freedom, the burqa ban is not necessary to
achieve these aims. Thus, the burqa ban constitutes an unreasonable limitation
on religious freedom, and the ECHR should recognize that, in light of these
aims, the ban does not comply with Article 9.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE BURQA BAN
To better explain the burqa ban’s incompatibility with Article 9, this
Comment uses the ECHR’s decisions in Şahin v. Turkey,25 Dahlab v.
Switzerland,26 and Dogru v. France27 to establish the framework through
which the court is likely to analyze this ban. First, however, it is helpful to
understand the social environment in France that led to the adoption of the
burqa ban and the role that the veil plays for those who wear it and in Islam.
This Part explains the role of the veil. Then, it summarizes the French social
climate by touching upon the legislative history of the ban, the French concept
of laïcité, and France’s relationship with its Muslim population.
A. The Veil’s Role in Islam
For the burqa ban to constitute an infringement of Article 9 rights, the
practice of wearing face-covering veils must be a religious practice.28 Whether
veiling is a religious practice, however, is a heavily debated issue. The Islamic
practice of veiling originated from interpretations of the text of the Quran,29
although the text itself does not mandate that women wear veils. Instead, it
requires that women dress modestly, and this requirement is interpreted to
require veiling.30 A woman’s duty to veil herself stems from the following text
of the Quran:
And say to the believing women

25

Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447.
27 Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow “CaseLaw” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case Title” box
and “France” in the “Respondent State” box).
28 See European Convention, supra note 14, art. 9(1).
29 The Quran is the religious text of the Islamic faith. When referring to specific verses of the Quran, this
Comment uses A. Yusuf Ali’s translation, The Holy Qur’ān: Text, Translation and Commentary.
30 Mukul Saxena, The French Headscarf Law and the Right To Manifest Religious Belief, 84 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 765, 778–79 (2007).
26
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That they should lower
Their gaze and guard
Their modesty; that they
Should not display their
Beauty and ornaments except
What (must ordinarily) appear
Thereof; that they should
Draw their veils over
Their bosoms and not display
Their beauty except
To their husbands, their fathers,
Their husbands’ fathers, their sons,
Their husbands’ sons,
Their brothers or their brothers’ sons.

31

Views differ as to what “modesty,” as defined in this provision, actually
means. What portions of a woman’s “beauty” may appear in public, and what
must a Muslim woman cover to appear modest?32 This lack of clear direction
has led to several forms of veiling in Muslim society, including the burqa, the
niqab, the sitar, the chador, and the headscarf. The burqa is a cloth that covers
a woman’s entire head and body; a mesh covering conceals the woman’s face
and eyes.33 The sitar is a long veil that covers a woman’s eyes and full body.34
The niqab covers a woman’s face and body, but allows the eyes to be seen.35
The chador is a full body cloak that does not cover the face.36 Finally, the
headscarf is a loosely tied scarf that only covers a woman’s neck and hair.37

31

QURAN 24:31.
Saxena, supra note 30, at 779–80.
33 Chidi Emmanuel, ‘Hijab Is Not a Ticket to Heaven,’ KUWAIT TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at 4, available at
http://issuu.com/kuwaitnews/docs/kt20100129.
34 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
35 Emmanuel, supra note 33.
36 Oriana Mazza, Note, The Right To Wear Headscarves and Other Religious Symbols in French,
Turkish, and American Schools: How the Government Draws a Veil on Free Expression of Faith, 48 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 305 (2009).
37 Id.
32
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A woman’s choice of veil depends upon her interpretation of this modesty
provision. Some Muslim women interpret their duty to be modest as the duty
to “draw their veils” over their hair only and not over their hands or eyes; thus
these women would dress modestly by wearing headscarves.38 Other Muslim
women include their face, their hands, and their eyes as part of their beauty.
These women would wear burqas to cover these body parts as well. Some
other Muslim women read no obligation to wear religious garb into the
provision, arguing that the absence of the mandate in the Quran means that
women are free to choose for themselves whether to wear religious garb.39
Muslim scholars have offered equally divergent views regarding the
meaning of “modesty” in this verse.40 The interpretation of the provision,
however, is “relative to the culture in which Muslims find themselves.”41
Women who come from stricter Muslim schools of interpretation, such as the
Salafists, often are compelled to wear the burqa or the niqab, while women
who are from less strict religious sects often wear the headscarf, or no religious
garb at all.42
In France, approximately 1,900 women wear the niqab and no women wear
the burqa, according to a study prepared in 2009 and cited by the January 26,
2010 Parliamentary Commission’s report (“Parliamentary Commission’s
Report”).43 Half of the women who wear the niqab are under thirty years old,
and ninety percent of the women are under forty years old.44 Further, twothirds of these women are of French nationality, and one-fourth of them are
converts to Islam.45 A statistic that was not ascertained, however, is how many
of these women wear the niqab because they choose to (based on religious
conviction, fear of harassment in public spaces, or cultural pride) and how
many of these women are pressured to wear the niqab by their husbands,
fathers, or Muslim religious officials.

38

Saxena, supra note 30, at 779.
See Emmanuel, supra note 33.
40 Saxena, supra note 30, at 779–80.
41 Id. at 779.
42 See Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8 (noting that forty percent of the women who
wear niqabs in France are Salafists).
43 Id. The Parliamentary Commission’s Report is a report issued by the French Parliament that explained
the significance of face-covering veils and also explored ways to ban them. See discussion infra Part I.B.
44 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
45 Id.
39

NANWANI GALLEYSFINAL

1438

2/28/2012 9:03 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

The compatibility of wearing the veil and gender equality is a contentious
issue. To many, the veil represents an oppressive instrument that signifies
women’s second-class status in Islam, rather than the fulfillment of a religious
obligation for the women who wear them.46 The Quran instructs men to ensure
that women under their care or responsibility are “covered” when they go out
in public,47 and, accordingly, some women who wear any of the forms of veils
see them as “sign[s] of male domination over women’s bodies and lives.”48
Those who believe that the veil is a symbol of oppression regard regulations
like the burqa ban as protection for women who would otherwise be forced to
wear veils. They view the ban as addressing “[o]ne of the most salient
concerns” for women who wear religious garb—that they do not choose to
wear veils, but rather are required to wear them “by their family, their
community, and their religion.”49
Proponents of the ban are also concerned about the veil representing
sexism. A Muslim feminist, Fatima Mernissi, characterized the veil as a means
to “relegate women to the domestic sphere and ‘to highlight their illegal
position on male territory by means of a mask.’”50 Further, Elisabeth Badinter,
a French feminist, “believes that the choice to wear this symbol signifies that
Muslim women are ‘closed up in their homes and confined to domestic
tasks.’”51 In other words, the veil serves as a constant reminder to women that
their role is confined to the kitchen and domestic activities.
“While it is a truism that numerous Muslim women wear religious garb as a
direct result of patriarchal imposition,”52 many Muslim women in France
choose to wear veils. Faiza Silmi, a Muslim woman who wears the niqab,
acknowledges that many believe that she is “under [her] husband’s command
and that [she] is a recluse.”53 However, while explaining her choice to wear the
niqab, Silmi clearly asserted that this is not the case: “It is my choice. I take
46

MONICA MOOKHERJEE, WOMEN’S RIGHTS AS MULTICULTURAL CLAIMS: RECONFIGURING GENDER

AND DIVERSITY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 131 (2009).
47 Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith,

Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim
Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 751 (2006).
48 Bennoune, supra note 11, at 390 (internal quotation mark omitted).
49 Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 767.
50 MOOKHERJEE, supra note 46, at 131 (quoting Fatima Mernissi, Virginity and Patriarchy, in WOMEN IN
ISLAM 183, 189 (Azizah al-Hibri ed., 1982)).
51 Id. at 132.
52 Yael Barbibay, Note, Citizenship Privilege or the Right to Religious Freedom: The Blackmailing of
France’s Islamic Women, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 159, 201 (2010).
53 Katrin Bennhold, A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2008, at A1
(internal quotation mark omitted).
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care of my children, and I leave the house when I please. I have my own car. I
do the shopping on my own. Yes, I am a practicing Muslim, I am orthodox.
But is that not my right?”54
Because “Islamic garments are religious, political, and personal
signifiers,”55 the choice to wear the veil can be motivated by a variety of
reasons. Most importantly for Article 9 purposes, the choice to wear a full veil
is often driven by religious beliefs.56 After France passed the 2004 law, a
prototype of the current burqa ban,57 Professor Adrien Katherine Wing, an
Arab American woman of Muslim origin, and Monica Nigh Smith collected
comments from Muslim women in France regarding their reasons for wearing
the headscarf. She found that many “believing Muslims” saw wearing the
headscarf as a requirement of the Quran and that, while girls felt pressure from
their families to wear the headscarf, “young women, between eighteen and
twenty-two, often decided to adopt the headscarf out of personal religious
conviction or pride.”58 Women understood the meaning of the headscarf in
Islam and chose to wear it for its significance.59 Notably, many of the young
girls who wore the headscarf had mothers who did not, which indicates a lack
of pressure from the family.60
However, the choice to wear the veil is not always motivated by religious
beliefs. Many women wear veils based on their own desire to dress modestly,
in an effort to avoid harassment from males and to appear less sexual.61 A
young Kuwaiti girl who wears a veil explained that “Islam is not only a
religion but a way of life. . . . [D]ressing in an Islamic way makes me feel more
relaxed and secure in a way. . . . The way you dress is the way you will be
addressed. . . . [I]f you dress respectfully, you will be respected.”62

54

Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
Barbibay, supra note 52, at 201.
56 Sadanand Dhume, The French Burqa Ban: Culture Clash Unveiled, YALEGLOBAL (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/french-burqa-ban-culture-clash-unveiled.
57 See discussion infra Part I.C.
58 Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 759.
59 See id. at 759–62.
60 Id. at 761–63. While the headscarf is a less extreme form of religious garb than face-covering veils,
Professor Wing’s research offers a useful comparison. It shows that some women find the requirement to dress
modestly, in general, to be a requirement of Islam. The women who dress modestly by wearing a headscarf
simply interpret the modesty requirement differently than those who wear the burqa, niqab, or sitar.
61 Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 762–64. The Parliamentary Commission’s Report listed the desire “to
keep one’s distance from a society perceived as perverted” as one of the primary motivations for women to
wear the veil. Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8 (citing Rapport No. 2262, supra note 16).
62 Emmanuel, supra note 33 (internal quotation mark omitted).
55
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Professor Wing and Ms. Smith explained that girls covered their heads and
bodies as “a form of protection . . . because they can come and go without
being an object of harassment by Muslim men.”63 Silmi also cited this reason
for her choice to wear a niqab: “I don’t like to draw men’s looks. . . . I want to
belong to my husband and my husband only.”64
In short, the choice to wear a veil can be based on “personal religious
conviction, freedom of religion, acceptance as a good Muslim female,
compliance with family values, neutralization of sexuality and protection from
harassment from Muslim males, and individual choice and religious/cultural
identity.”65 This Comment focuses on those women in France who wear facecovering veils as a manifestation of “personal religious conviction,” because it
is only in these cases that the burqa ban interferes with Article 9 religious
freedom.66
B. The Legal History of the Burqa Ban
French President Nicolas Sarkozy did not acknowledge the fact that women
sometimes themselves choose to wear the veil when he announced his
intention to prohibit the practice during an address to both houses of the French
Parliament. During the June 22, 2009 speech, President Sarkozy characterized
the burqa as “a sign of subservience” and explained that France “cannot accept
that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived
of all identity.”67 Thus, he declared that the burqa “will not be welcome on the
territory of the French Republic.”68
On June 23, 2009, following President Sarkozy’s address, the French
National Assembly assembled a commission of inquiry, comprised of thirtytwo lawmakers, to “study the practice of wearing the ‘full veil’” and to explore
ways of restricting the veil’s use.69 The Parliamentary Commission’s mandate
63

Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 763.
Bennhold, supra note 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65 Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 758.
66 Article 9 is not interpreted to include every act motivated by religion when a neutral law, such as the
burqa ban, conflicts with freedom of religion. Rather, Article 9 application is limited to acts that are
manifestations of religion. Javier Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587, 595–96 (2005).
67 Associated Press, Sarkozy: Burqas ‘Not Welcome’ in France, CBS NEWS (June 22, 2009), http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/22/world/main5103076.shtml [hereinafter Burqas ‘Not Welcome’].
68 Id.
69 Ismail, supra note 8, at 51; accord France Sets Up Burka Commission, supra note 8. See generally
Rapport No. 2262, supra note 16.
64
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did not specifically mention the burqa, the niqab, or the sitar, but used the more
“neutral” term “full veil.”70 The commission conducted research over six
months; it “heard 211 witnesses and experts, sent questionnaires to the French
Embassies located in the E.U. Members States, the United States, Canada,
Turkey, and several Arab countries” and visited Belgium, where a draft bill
banning people from wearing face-covering veils was pending in the senate.71
The Parliamentary Commission’s Report characterized the full veil as
“contrary to the values of the Republic.”72 The commission recommended that
parliament adopt a resolution describing the full veil as such and a “law
prohibiting the full veil as well as any other clothing entirely covering the face
in public spaces, based upon the notion of public order.” 73
Following the Parliamentary Commission’s Report, the French Prime
Minister requested that the Conseil d’État (“Council of State”)74 examine the
“legal grounds for a ban on the full veil,” specifying that the study should be
“as wide and effective as possible.”75 The Council of State issued a report on
March 25, 2010, which “found that no incontestable legal basis can be relied
upon in support of a ban on wearing the full veil.”76 The report further stated
that a “[p]rohibition of the full veil would violate various fundamental rights
and freedoms: individual freedom, personal freedom, right to privacy, freedom
of expression and freedom to manifest [one’s] convictions, notably religious,
and prohibition of any discrimination.”77 Despite these findings, the Council of
State reported that it was “possible” to envision ways of banning faceconcealing clothing.78 It envisioned a ban that would “rely on the need for
public security,” and suggested that the prohibition “be backed by a system of
sanctions . . . . [that] should be harsher for a person convicted of obliging
70

Ismail, supra note 8, at 51.
Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
72 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
73 Id.
74 The Council of State is one of the three high courts in France. Beller, supra note 19, at 602. It, along
with the Constitutional Council and the Cour de Cassation, decides the constitutionality of French laws. See
id. The Council of State is an administrative court that hears cases brought by private citizens, but its decisions
can be overruled by an ordinary statute. Id. at 603.
75 REPORTS & STUDIES SECTION, CONSEIL D’ETAT, STUDY OF POSSIBLE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR BANNING
THE FULL VEIL: REPORT ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT 7 (2010)
[hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT] (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.conseiletat.fr/cde/media/document/rapport%20etudes/etude_voile_integral_anglais.pdf. This request was made on
January 29, 2010, just three days after the commission issued its report. Id.
76 Id. at 19.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 40.
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somebody.”79 The report included the assessment of fines and citizenship
classes as possible sanctions.80
On May 19, 2010, the French National Assembly issued a draft bill,
containing seven articles.81 This bill passed through the lower house of
parliament by a vote of 336 to 1.82 The senate then approved the ban on
September 14, 2010, by a vote of 246 to 1.83 Finally, the presidents of each
house of parliament submitted the bill to the Constitutional Council,84 which
had previously warned that “a blanket ban on all veils in the streets of France
might not [pass] constitutional muster.”85 On October 7, 2010, despite its
previous warning, the Constitutional Council endorsed the bill, and the burqa
ban passed its last domestic legal obstacle.86 In its decision, the Constitutional
Council explained that the ban conforms to the French Constitution because
the ban “[does] not impose disproportionate punishments or prevent the free
exercise of religion in a place of worship.”87 The burqa ban, having surpassed
all of the domestic legal hurdles, went into effect on April 11, 2011.88
Notably, the final provisions of the burqa ban are similar to those that the
Council of State recommended in its report.89 The burqa ban creates two
punishable offenses, both wearing a face-covering veil and forcing another to
wear a face-covering veil, and punishes the latter more harshly.90 Supporters of
the bill cite public security and the promotion of gender equality as two main
justifications for the ban.91 Finally, the burqa ban imposes a system of
79

Id. at 40–42.
Id. at 43.
81 Assemblée Nationale No. 2520, supra note 4.
82 France Votes To Ban Full-Face Veils, supra note 5.
83 French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, supra note 5.
84 The Constitutional Council is the tribunal in France that decides the constitutionality of laws that are
under consideration in the French Parliament. Beller, supra note 19, at 602. It decides only cases that are
brought to it by government officials. Id. Its decisions carry considerable weight in France; a constitutional
ruling by the Constitutional Council can only be overruled by amending the constitution. Id. at 603.
85 Souchard, supra note 18.
86 Id.; CNN Wire Staff, French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, CNN (Oct. 7, 2010, 3:19 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/07/france.burqa.ban/index.html [hereinafter French Burqa Ban
Clears Last Legal Obstacle].
87 French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, supra note 86.
88 See Erlanger, supra note 6.
89 Compare Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace
public [Law 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010 Banning the Concealment of the Face in the Public Space] arts. 1–4,
J.O., Oct. 12, 2010, p. 1, with COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 40–44.
90 Loi 2010-1192 arts. 1–4.
91 See Copé, supra note 7. A third justification for the burqa ban is the argument that face-covering veils
hamper social relations. Id. This justification, however, is not considered in this Comment.
80
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sanctions for violating the bill, including fines and mandatory citizenship
classes.92
At the time of this writing, France’s new burqa ban is the first general
prohibition of full veils in Western Europe, but several European countries
have engaged in public debates regarding the full veil and are considering
similar laws.93 Italy, a country with more than one million Muslims, has tried
to expand a preexisting law to forbid people from wearing religious garments
that make facial identification impossible.94 Belgium has proposed a law
imposing sanctions on those who conceal their faces with clothing, which was
passed by the House of Representatives on April 29, 2010.95 The Spanish
community of Catalonia passed multiple local regulations that ban facial
concealment in public.96 Denmark is engaged in a “passionate” debate
regarding the full veil, and is studying ways to ban the veil without violating its
constitution.97 Finally, Germany and Austria adopted legislation that prohibits
people attending outdoor events from wearing garments that prevent
identification, except if the outdoor event is one of several, specified religious
services.98 Because decisions by the ECHR are binding upon the European
Union as a whole,99 a decision by the ECHR regarding the burqa ban would
likely have implications upon all of these countries and their efforts to prohibit
Muslim women from wearing the burqa, niqab, and sitar.
C. The Concept of Laïcité and the Relationship Between France and Its
Muslim Population
Although France did not cite laïcité as a justification for the burqa ban, this
principle is central to the deeply engrained value of freedom of religion in
France, and it contributes significantly to a culture in which the prohibition of
92

Loi 2010-1192 arts. 3–4.
COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 15–17.
94 Nick Pisa, Now Italy Considers Banning the Burqa Too, DAILY MAIL, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/worldnews/article-1218543/Now-Italy-considers-banning-burqa-too.html (last updated Oct. 7, 2009,
6:16 PM).
95 Rapport au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du
Règlement et d’administration générale sur le projet de loi [Report on Behalf of the Committee on
Constitutional Law, Legislation, Universal Suffrage, the Regulations, and General Administration], Sénat
Rapport No. 699, at 12 (Sept. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Sénat Rapport No. 699], http://www.senat.fr/rap/l09699/l09-6991.pdf.
96 Id.
97 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
98 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 16.
99 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 111 (2d ed. 2006).
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the veil is possible.100 The French concept of laïcité is often translated as
“secular,” but that definition fails to “evoke the important connotations of the
French” term.101 Generally, however, laïcité means “a separation between
church and state that protects the freedom of religion and of non-religion,
whose intention is to avoid any discrimination against people on the basis of
their religious affiliation or lack thereof.”102
This definition seems to take a neutral stance on the issue of religious
freedom, similar to the United States’ concept of freedom of religion under the
First Amendment.103 However, that is not the case; “[t]he theory is that to be
French is to be part of a proverbial melting pot, rather than an American style
salad bowl of religious and other identities.”104 Laïcité is a secular concept that
“conveys . . . a profound suspicion” and “a somewhat tense attitude where
religion is concerned.”105 Rather than allowing the free exercise and expression
of all religions, France has moved toward “fundamentalist secularism,” where
the government “denies religious conviction or belief any place for expression
in the public realm.”106 Laïcité has “functioned as a tool of coercive cultural
uniformity . . . especially among immigrant populations” instead of as a means
of multiculturalism.107
The French attitude of fundamentalist secularism is reflected in France’s
treatment of its Muslim population and Muslims’ difficulties with integration
into French society; though laïcité originated as a principle that separates
church from state, it has become a French excuse for increasing
Islamophobia.108 With an estimated five to six million Muslim residents, many
100 Article 1 of the French Constitution reflects the importance of laïcité in France, declaring that France
is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social republic that ensures the equality of all citizens before the law.
1958 CONST. 1.
101 W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 154 (2010).
102 Jean-Paul Willaime, The Paradoxes of Laïcité in France (Allyn Hardyck trans.), in THE CENTRALITY
OF RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES A. BECKFORD 41, 41 (Eileen Barker ed., 2010).
103 The First Amendment reads, in part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend I.
104 Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 755.
105 Willaime, supra note 102, at 41.
106 Jennifer M. Westerfield, Note, Behind the Veil: An American Legal Perspective on the European
Headscarf Debate, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 637, 639 (2006).
107 ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI‘A 40 (2008).
108 Bruce Crumley, France’s Crusade Against Faith, TIME (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,2024135,00.html. Islamophobia is a term that “denotes hostility towards Islam and
Muslims.” Bennoune, supra note 11, at 393.

NANWANI GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

2/28/2012 9:03 AM

THE BURQA BAN

1445

of whom are French citizens, France has the largest Muslim population in
Western Europe.109 However, despite their considerable presence within
France, French Muslims are “[o]ften the victims of racism and
discrimination . . . [and] uniformly perceived and treated as outsiders in French
society.”110 In reaction to the attacks of 9/11, the war in Iraq, and France’s
concerns regarding terrorism, France has dealt with its large Muslim
population “in a context of heightened security” and discrimination.111 This
discrimination especially affects Muslim women who, because of their
religious dress, “become[] . . . easy target[s] for those fearing Islamic
fundamentalists.”112
On March 15, 2004, France passed the statute regulating, as part of the
implementation of the principle of laïcité, the wearing of symbols or clothing
that evince religious affiliation in public elementary schools, junior high
schools, and high schools (“2004 Law”).113 This law, which also passed by an
overwhelming majority, prohibited children in public schools from wearing
symbols or clothing that manifest any religious affiliation.114 The 2004 Law
technically affected children of all religions, including those who wore
yarmulkes, crosses, and turbans.115 Despite its universal application, however,
the 2004 Law “has been and is effectively still seen as the ‘law on the Muslim
headscarf.’”116 It was aimed specifically at the headscarf,117 which represented
a challenge to “the fragile compromise . . . achieved between different
religious groups in Europe, and which [was] weakened by a new community

109

Souchard, supra note 18; AN-NA‘IM, supra note 107, at 41.
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 107, at 41.
111 Willaime, supra note 102, at 47.
112 Wing & Smith, supra note 47, at 753.
113 Dominique Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War? The French Statute of March
15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 343 (2006).
114 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de
tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of
Mar. 15, 2004 Regulating, in Accordance with the Principle of Laïcité, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing
Denoting Religious Affiliation in Schools, Colleges and High Schools], J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190; see also
DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 101, at 154–58.
115 See DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 101, at 155. See generally Loi 2004-228.
116 Willaime, supra note 102, at 48. Because of France’s secular philosophy, it is unable to pass a law
concerning a particular religion. Id. To legislate the wearing of headscarves, France had to pass a law aimed at
all religious dress in public schools. Id.
117 See DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 101, at 154 (noting that the Prime Minister said during a radio
interview prior to the adoption of the law that “Muslim headscarves ‘should absolutely’ be prohibited in public
schools”).
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that wants to be recognized and identified with its religion.”118 The 2004 Law
was the French government’s “way of dealing with religious expression . . . by
singling out and stigmatising some of [Islam’s] followers.”119 Although France
defended the law by citing laïcité as its justification, some argue that the 2004
Law was actually “driven by irrational fear of the Muslim alien.”120
The 2004 Law was only one of several signs of the rising Islamophobia in
France. In October 2005, the tense relationship between France and its Muslim
population erupted into a series of riots that lasted for several weeks.121 The
riots took place in “squalid” suburban neighborhoods and were led by France’s
poor, minority population, consisting mostly of Muslims of Arab and African
descent.122 They were “spontaneous revolt[s] by youths frustrated by racial and
economic discrimination”123 and were extremely violent, consisting of
torching, explosions, and vandalism.124 Mohammed Job, a young African
Muslim who took part in the riots, described the frustration that led to the
revolts; according to Job, living in France granted minorities the “freedom to
be poor and unequal . . . . The French want to suppress anything that doesn’t
seem purely French.”125 The riots tapered off by mid-November, but served as
a tool by France’s minority population to get the government to notice its
struggles.126
Islamophobia in France is also demonstrated through Muslim women’s
difficulty in attaining French citizenship; women who wear the veil feel
discriminated against while applying for citizenship.127 In 2008, The Economist
and The New York Times published articles about Faiza Silmi, a young
Moroccan woman whose “application for French nationality was rejected for
‘lack of assimilation.’”128 She appealed the decision, and was denied French

118

Charles Fleming, French Bid To Ban Religious Garb Vexes Muslims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2003, at
A15 (quoting Marie-Claire Foblets, professor of law and anthropology at the Catholic University of Leven in
Belgium).
119 Willaime, supra note 102, at 48.
120 AN-NA‘IM, supra note 107, at 41.
121 Colin Nickerson, Behind French Unrest, Cries of Racism, Neglect, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2005, at A1.
122 Id.
123 Charles Bremner, Paris Riots Sparked by Frustration, Report Says, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 9, 2005, at 10.
124 See Nickerson, supra note 121.
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 A Burqa Barrier: How Islamic Headgear Can Stop a Woman Becoming French, ECONOMIST (July 17,
2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11751650 [hereinafter A Burqa Barrier].
128 Id.; accord Bennhold, supra note 53.
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citizenship again.129 The Council of State explained that she was denied
citizenship because she “adopted a radical practice of her religion,
incompatible with the essential values of the French community, and
particularly with the principle of sexual equality.”130 The case of Faiza Silmi
was not an isolated incident, as the Council of State has recognized France’s
ability to deny citizenship based on the niqab’s perceived incompatibility with
gender equality.131 Specifically, the Council of State explained that it is legally
justified for the Minister of the Interior to deny French citizenship to someone
who wears the full veil, based on a finding that the full veil “is incompatible
with the fundamental values of the French community, and notably with the
principle of sexual equality.”132
The burqa ban “comes at a time of increased European antagonism toward
Muslim immigrants in their midst.”133 The French feel threatened by the
growing Muslim population in France “openly practicing their way of life” and
“feel that they need to restore ‘Frenchness’ to their streets.”134 They are doing
this, in part, by targeting Muslim women, the group of people that most
conspicuously does not conform to traditional French ideals of dress.135
Muslim leaders have warned that the burqa ban “will stigmatize the French
Muslim population” even further,136 but increased stigmatization may be
exactly what France would like to achieve.

129

A Burqa Barrier, supra note 127.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 11.
132 Id.
133 Mohammed Ayoob, Op-Ed., Veil Ban a Symbol of Hypocrisy, Fear, CNN (July 15, 2010, 11:51 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/07/15/ayoob.veil.muslim.france/index.html.
134 Sandeep Gopalan, Behind the Burqa, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/28/opinion/28iht-edgopalan.html. Further, Muslim women face antagonism from French citizens on a
daily basis. This antagonism is well demonstrated by an incident where a woman in Paris engaged in
aggravated violence against a woman who was wearing a face-covering veil because she wanted to pull off her
veil, which the attacker described as a “muzzle.” Associated Press, Paris Court Hands Woman Suspended
Sentence for Veil Attack, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/04/womansuspended-sentence-veil-attack.
135 See Gopalan, supra note 134. France’s Muslim men also encounter discrimination based on
stereotypes. For example, in 2006, France withdrew security clearance from seventy-two Muslim men who
were working at the Roissy Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. Lara Marlowe, 72 Muslim Staff at Paris Airport
Seen As ‘Danger,’ IRISH TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at 12. Jacques Lebrot, the deputy prefect in charge of security,
attributed the withdrawals to “vulnerability or danger.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He explained
that the airport had “to wonder about someone who goes several times on holiday to Pakistan.” Id. (internal
quotation mark omitted). French officials, however, refused to give any support for terrorist allegations against
the men who lost their clearance. Id.
136 Souchard, supra note 18.
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II. THE ECHR FRAMEWORK
This Part outlines the Article 9 guidelines that this Comment uses to
analyze the ban. First, however, this Part summarizes the procedural steps that
must be taken before a case enters the jurisdiction of the ECHR.
A. ECHR Procedure
For a petition to be heard by the ECHR, an individual “claiming to be the
victim of a violation” of the European Convention would have to file an
application with the ECHR after exhausting all domestic remedies.137 In other
words, the applicant must have already sought relief, to no avail, through the
French legal system.138 At the time of this writing, no case has yet been filed in
the French courts challenging the constitutionality of the burqa ban under
applicable provisions of the constitution, but the Constitutional Council has
issued an advisory opinion stating that the ban is constitutional.139 The
applicant would also have to demonstrate that the complaint is not ill-founded,
and that she has “suffered a significant disadvantage.”140
These requirements—that the applicant must have exhausted all domestic
remedies and suffered a significant disadvantage—are significant hurdles that
would need to be overcome before the ECHR could hear a challenge to the
burqa ban. However, this Comment assumes that an applicant will successfully
satisfy all procedural requirements, and that the ECHR will accept jurisdiction
over the case.141 If the ECHR found that the burqa ban does, in fact, violate
Article 9, it can issue an award, which is “normally . . . a sum of money to be
paid by the respondent Government to the victim or victims of the violations

137

European Convention, supra note 14, arts. 34–35.
See id. art. 35.
139 Souchard, supra note 18. The Institutional Act on the Constitutional Council allows the council to give
advisory opinions on the constitutionality of bills, even when there is not a live case or controversy. See
Ordonnance 58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 portant loi organique sur le Conseil consittutionnel [Ordinance 581067 of Nov. 7, 1958, Institutional Act on the Constitutional Council], J.O., Nov. 9, 1958, p. 10129.
140 European Convention, supra note 14, art. 35.
141 A challenge to the burqa ban can likely overcome ECHR jurisdictional hurdles. Amnesty International
is a likely candidate to file a petition with the ECHR; the organization has publicly condemned the burqa ban,
characterizing the law as a “violat[ion of] the rights to freedom of expression and religion of those women who
wear the burqa or the niqab as an expression of their identity or beliefs.” France Votes To Ban Full-Face Veils,
supra note 5 (internal quotation mark omitted). Additionally, the Constitutional Council has ruled that the
burqa ban is in accordance with the French Constitution, therefore making the possibility of a domestic remedy
for this violation of religious freedom unlikely. Souchard, supra note 18.
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found.”142 The ECHR can also issue an order aimed at ending the violating
practice, but it only does this in rare circumstances.143
B. Article 9 Analysis
Once a petition regarding the burqa ban reaches the ECHR, the court will
assess the law in accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention, which
grants freedom of religion to citizens of the European Union while also
allowing for restrictions to be placed on this freedom.144 The first clause of
Article 9 grants freedom of religion, stating, “Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.”145 However, the second clause of Article 9,
known as the limitations clause, expressly attaches a limitation to this
fundamental freedom:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
146
and freedoms of others.

This clause sets out three requirements that, if satisfied, allow a government to
limit someone’s freedom to manifest religion: the restriction must be (1)
prescribed by law; (2) in pursuit of legitimate aims; and (3) necessary in a
democratic society.147
Although the ECHR did not decide a case under the limitations clause until
1993,148 the court has since recognized that one’s freedom of religion can be
limited. The ECHR has explained, “Article 9 does not protect every act

142 RULES OF COURT: PRACTICE DIRECTIONS: JUST SATISFACTION CLAIMS para. 23 (Registry of the Court,
Eur. Court of Human Rights 2009).
143 Id.
144 European Convention, supra note 14, art. 9.
145 Id. art. 9(1).
146 Id. art. 9(2).
147 Id. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also recognizes the fundamental freedom
of religion, and the concurrent limitation on the freedom, in language that is nearly identical to that in Article 9
of the European Convention. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
148 Kamal, supra note 24, at 672.
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motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.”149 Rather, “it may be necessary
to place restrictions on freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs
are respected.”150
The ECHR has made three notable decisions limiting Muslim women’s
freedom to wear religious garb under Article 9: Şahin v. Turkey, Dahlab v.
Switzerland, and Dogru v. France. In Şahin, the ECHR found justified under
the European Convention an Istanbul University resolution that banned the
donning of headscarves on campus, even though the policy “constituted an
interference with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion.”151 Similarly, in
Dahlab, the ECHR upheld a policy that prohibited a teacher from wearing a
headscarf while performing teaching duties.152 Finally, in Dogru, the ECHR
found that a French school’s expulsion of a student who refused to remove her
headscarf during a gym class did not violate Article 9 because the action was
“justified as a matter of principle and proportionate to the aim pursued.”153
In deciding Şahin, Dahlab, and Dogru, the ECHR engaged in a three-step
analysis.154 The court first concluded that the respective restrictions constituted
interferences with religious freedom155 and were “prescribed by law.”156 Next,
the ECHR assessed whether the interferences pursued “legitimate aims.”157
The ECHR finally considered whether, in light of the legitimate aims, the
interference with religious freedom was “necessary in a democratic society,” or
proportional to the aims pursued.158 Throughout its analyses, the ECHR
referred to the margin of appreciation, or the extent of deference, that it granted
to the nation states; the larger the margin of appreciation that the ECHR

149

Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 202.
Id. at 203.
151 Id. at 197 (internal quotation mark omitted).
152 Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 462, 464.
153 Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow
“Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case Title”
box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box).
154 See BEDERMAN, supra note 99, at 46 (noting that international tribunals almost invariably follow their
precedents).
155 Dogru, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13–14; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 196–97; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 460.
156 Dogru, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14–16; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 197–201; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 458, 461.
157 Dogru, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 201; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 459.
158 Dogru, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16–21; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 202–206; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 462.
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granted to the state, the more discretion the state had to restrict religious
practices.159 In each case, the ECHR found that the restrictions satisfied the
aforementioned conditions and characterized the interferences as justifiable
limits on the freedom of religion.160
Two of the main inquiries undertaken by the ECHR in these cases, whether
the restriction is prescribed by law and whether it is in pursuit of legitimate
aims, are rarely decisive in Article 9 cases.161 Thus, this Comment does not
heavily focus on either of these two requirements in its analysis of the burqa
ban. Rather, this Comment assesses whether the ban interferes with religious
freedom and whether it is necessary in a democratic society.
The necessity analysis involves two inquiries. First, in deciding whether a
measure is “necessary in a democratic society” and thus is a justifiable
limitation, the ECHR has stressed that limitations placed on freedom of
religion should be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.162
Proportionality, which “implies the need to strike a proper balance between
various competing interests,”163 is not expressly included in the European
Convention, but has “become ‘one of the central principles’ or an ‘essential
component’ in rights analysis.”164 Though the ECHR has explained that a
measure is proportional so long as there is “a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate objectives
pursued by the interference,” it has not provided any clear guidelines with
which to assess proportionality.165 In fact, the proportionality principle is

159 Dogru, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19–20; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 204; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 462–63. The term “margin of appreciation” describes “the amount of discretion the Court gives
national authorities in fulfilling their obligations under the Convention.” Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 115 (2005). It is comparable to the U.S. courts’ use of a standard of review. Id.; see
also discussion infra Part III.B.3.
160 Notably, however, Şahin, Dahlab, and Dogru are distinct from the burqa ban, in that each of these
cases involved limitations within a public school setting, while the burqa ban applies to all public spaces
generally.
161 Kamal, supra note 24, at 679 (noting that the ECHR had never decided a case based on the failure to
pursue a legitimate aim and had only relied on the “prescribed by law” requirement in two cases).
162 Gunn, supra note 22, at 468; Martínez-Torrón, supra note 66, at 599.
163 Gunn, supra note 22, at 469 (quoting P. VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (3d ed. 1998)).
164 Id. (quoting Jeremy McBride, Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 23, 23, 27 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999).
165 Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 207. The dissenting opinion of Şahin, written by Judge
Tulkens, attempted to provide some guidelines; it explained that the proportional inquiry “entails a balancing
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“heavy with uncertainty”166 and the test “has not been applied in a uniform
manner.”167
This Comment suggests that the ECHR analyze the proportionality
principle using three criteria articulated by Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn.168 This
tripartite test is “the most widely accepted explanation[] of proportionality in
the European context,” because it seeks to assess proportionality based on the
Constitutions of many members of the European Convention.169 While the
ECHR has not previously mechanically applied the tripartite test in Article 9
cases,170 it should do so going forward, because the tripartite test articulates the
understanding of proportionality throughout much of Europe and provides
predictability and clarity in an inquiry that has few guidelines.171
The tripartite test is as follows. “[T]he measure must [first] be
appropriate . . . for attaining its objective,” meaning that the measure should
have “theoretical capacity to accomplish its aim.”172 Second, “the measure
must be necessary . . . to achieve its intended purposes,” rather than merely
suitable.173 A measure is likely unnecessary if a less restrictive alternative is
available.174 Finally, “the measure must be proportionate to the objective,”
meaning that “[t]he burden must not be excessive relative to the objective.”175

of the competing interests.” Id. at 221 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the
dissenting opinion fully explored which factors should be employed in this balancing.
166 Gunn, supra note 22, at 470 (quoting D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 291 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167 Id. (quoting VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 163, at 81).
168 Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn is a former Director of the American Civil Liberties Union Program on Freedom
of Religion and Belief, a Senior Fellow in Religion and Human Rights in Emory University’s Center for the
Study of Law and Religion, and current law professor in Morocco. Id. at 465 n.*; Dr. Jeremy Gunn, AL
AKHAWAYN UNIV., http://citi.aui.ma/shss/Jeremy_Gunn (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
169 Gunn, supra note 22, at 467; accord Takis Tridimas, Proportionality in Community Law: Searching
for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 65,
68 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999).
170 See Gunn, supra note 22, at 468. However, the principle of proportionality in the ECHR was derived
from the use of the tripartite test. Lord Hoffman, The Influence of the European Principle of Proportionality
upon UK Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE, supra note 169, at 107, 107.
171 See generally Tridimas, supra note 169; Walter van Gerven, The Effect of Proportionality on the
Actions of Member States of the European Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe, in THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE, supra note 169, at 37.
172 Gunn, supra note 22, at 467 (emphasis omitted).
173 Id. (emphasis omitted).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 468 (emphasis omitted).
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The second necessity inquiry is the extent of deference that the ECHR
should grant to nation-states involved.176 The deference granted is referred to
as a margin of appreciation, and a margin of appreciation analysis is implicated
in each case with a proportionality inquiry.177 In fact, the margin of
appreciation granted to the nation-state likely will play a greater role in the
ECHR decision-making process than the proportionality inquiry.178
The doctrine of margin of appreciation operates to give “the role of the
national decision-making body . . . special importance.”179 The ECHR either
grants the relevant nation-state a wide margin of appreciation, which gives the
state more latitude in restricting individuals’ rights, or a narrow margin of
appreciation, which means the state’s limitation faces stricter scrutiny.180
Unfortunately, ECHR decisions that refer to the margin of appreciation fail to
articulate clear standards for its application, resulting in decisions that are
“likely to become mere ratifications of national action.”181 This Comment also
analyzes the margin of appreciation that the ECHR should give to France,
based upon the limited guidance that the ECHR has provided in this area of
inquiry.
III. THE BURQA BAN DOES NOT COMPLY WITH ARTICLE 9’S LIMITATIONS
CLAUSE
This Part applies the ECHR analysis to the burqa ban, and assesses whether
the burqa ban complies with the limitations clause of Article 9 of the European
Convention. To comply with the limitations clause, the burqa ban must be (1)
prescribed by law; (2) in pursuit of legitimate aims; and (3) necessary in a

176

See id. at 485–87.
Id. at 486–87.
178 See id. at 468.
179 Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 204.
180 Compare Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow
“Case Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Lautsi” in the “Case Title”
box and “Italy” in the “Respondent State” box) (rejecting Italy’s claim that it should be able to display
crucifixes in classrooms because the practice was part of Italian culture) overruled by Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow
“HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “2011” in the “Text” box, “Lautsi” in the “Case Title” box, and
“Italy” in the “Respondent State” box), with Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (condoning a resolution that banned
the donning of headscarves on campus).
181 Gunn, supra note 22, at 487 (quoting Thomas A. O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine:
Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474, 476 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
177
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democratic society.182 Because the burqa ban has a basis in France’s domestic
law and is accessible to French citizens, the ECHR will likely find that the ban
is prescribed by law.183 Thus, this Part provides no further discussion of this
requirement.
Rather, this Part focuses on the remaining Article 9 requirements. It briefly
discusses whether the ban’s stated aims are legitimate, and then analyzes
whether, in light of these aims, the ban is necessary in a democratic society.
First, however, this Part argues that the burqa ban constitutes an interference
with freedom of religion and thus meets the threshold Article 9 requirement.
A. The Burqa Ban Interferes with Freedom of Religion
First, the “threshold inquiry [is] whether the state action actually infringes
on an individual’s right.”184 To even fall under Article 9 analysis, the burqa
ban must constitute an interference with the right of religious freedom.185 The
ECHR has acknowledged the extreme importance of one’s freedom of religion,
stating that:
As enshrined in Article 9 [of the European Convention], freedom of
thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a
“democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in
its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society,
186
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.

Cutting against the argument that the burqa ban interferes with one’s religious
freedom is the fact that the burqa ban is a neutral provision that calls for the
universal prohibition of all face-covering clothing in public spaces, rather than

182

European Convention, supra note 14, art. 9(2).
In Dogru, the ECHR explained that“prescribed by law” requires that a restriction has a basis in
domestic law and is accessible. Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN
(follow “Case Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case
Title” box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box). The burqa ban undisputedly has a basis in domestic
law because it was passed by the French Parliament. See Souchard, supra note 18.
184 Kamal, supra note 24, at 676.
185 See id.; Martínez-Torrón, supra note 66, at 593.
186 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 17 (1993); see also Gunn, supra note 22, at 492.
183
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specifically prohibiting full veils.187 Also cutting against the argument that the
burqa ban interferes with freedom of religion is that the Quran does not
specifically mandate that women wear face-concealing garments.188 The
Parliamentary Commission’s Report clearly indicates that the practice of
wearing face-covering veils is based upon an interpretation of the Quran, rather
than on the text of the Quran itself.189 The former rector of the Paris Grand
Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, explained that the burqa has nothing to do with
Islam, and that the niqab was originally used as protection against sun, wind,
and sand.190 Notably, some Muslim women would argue the same. In an
interview conducted by the Kuwait Times, a woman who chooses to go out in
public unveiled explained that she believes that wearing a veil is an outdated
tradition that is not called for by Islam: “I don’t think God will put me in hell
for not wearing a niqab, hijab or burqa. What matters most is how clean and
sincere your heart is, not how much you cover your body. . . . [M]oreover it is
not even in the Holy Quran.”191
Although the French ban does not refer to religion and the Quran does not
mention the burqa, niqab, or sitar,192 according to Article 9 of the European
Convention and ECHR precedent, the burqa ban is still an interference with
religious freedom. It would be insensible to conclude that the burqa ban does
not interfere with religion, based solely upon its neutral pretense. Though the
bill does not mention Islam, the burqa, the niqab, or sitar explicitly, it is
“common knowledge” that the burqa ban is “primarily aimed at the Muslim
full body and face-concealing garments.”193 In other words, the
“legislators . . . carefully draft[ed] a statute so that it appears to be neutral, but
in fact it unfairly targets a particular religious group.”194 French President
Sarkozy said as much in calling for parliament to pass the ban.195
187 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law
2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010 Banning the Concealment of the Face in the Public Space] arts. 1–4, J.O., Oct. 12,
2010, p. 1.
188 QURAN 24:31.
189 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
190 Id.
191 Emmanuel, supra note 33 (internal quotation mark omitted).
192 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
193 Ismail, supra note 8, at 47.
194 Gunn, supra note 22, at 487–88.
195 See Burqas ‘Not Welcome,’ supra note 67. The ban’s targeting of the Muslim population is
demonstrated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s remarks from June 22, 2009, before parliament even
drafted the burqa ban. President Sarkozy explicitly stated that the burqa is not welcome in France. Id. A
parliamentary commission was then formed to explore ways to prohibit face-covering veils. See Highlights of
Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
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Further, wearing the veil can still be a religious practice, even though the
Quran does not explicitly require it. Many religious practices—in Islam,
Judaism, Christianity, and other faiths—are products of tradition, rather than of
explicit religious canons or texts.196 While some Muslim women argue that the
Quran does not mandate the practice of veiling, others argue the opposite;
Silmi, for example, stated in an interview, “[a] woman must cover herself. It’s
written in the Quran.”197 Moreover, even the ECHR has acknowledged that the
wearing of veils is a religious practice. In Dahlab, the ECHR supported the
national court’s characterization of the headscarf as a “powerful religious
symbol” and noted that the practice of wearing the headscarf “indicates
allegiance to a particular faith and a desire to behave in accordance with the
precepts laid down by that faith.”198 The ECHR has also explicitly held that a
restriction placed on the right to wear the headscarf constitutes an interference
with religious freedom, according to Article 9 of the European Convention. In
Şahin, the ECHR adopted a finding that:
[B]y wearing the headscarf, [the applicant] was obeying a religious
precept and thereby manifesting her desire to comply strictly with the
duties imposed by the Islamic faith. Accordingly, her decision to
wear the headscarf may be regarded as motivated or inspired by a
religion or belief and . . . the Court proceeds on the assumption that
the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions of place and
manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf . . . constituted an
199
interference with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion.

Like the headscarf, the burqa, the niqab, and the sitar serve as powerful
religious symbols for the women who wear them as manifestations of their
beliefs.200 Thus, regardless of the burqa ban’s neutral language and the absence

196 For example, the celebration of Ash Wednesday in the Christian religion is not mentioned in the Bible,
but is still regarded as a religious practice. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mick, Ash Wednesday: Our Shifting
Understanding of Lent, CATH. UPDATE, Feb. 2004, available at http://www.americancatholic.org/newsletters/
cu/ac0204.asp. Similarly, the Jewish practice of wearing the yarmulke is a religious practice, despite the fact
that the practice is not explicitly mandated in the Torah. See, e.g., Kippah/Yarmulke, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/religion/religions/judaism/customs/yarmulke.shtml (last updated June 23, 2009).
197 Associated Press, France Moves Closer to Banning Full Muslim Veil: Critics Argue Proposed Move
Would Be Violation of Basic Rights, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34874754/ns/world_newseurope/t/france-moves-closer-banning-full-muslim-veil (last updated Jan. 15, 2010, 7:54 AM) [hereinafter
France Closer to Banning Full Veil].
198 Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 452 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199 Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur.Ct. H.R. 173, 197.
200 For the women who wear veils for other reasons, including the desire to avoid harassment or looks by
men, veiling is not a manifestation of belief. See discussion supra Part I.A. However, France has not presented
statistics to show that the French women who wear niqabs are doing so for non-religious reasons. See
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of the explicit mandate in the Quran, the practice of wearing the full veil is a
religious practice for some women, and the burqa ban is an interference with
their religious freedom. This characterization has been confirmed by the ECHR
in the context of the headscarf.201
B. The Burqa Ban: An Unnecessary Law in a Democratic Society
After the ECHR finds that the burqa ban passes the threshold requirement
of interfering with freedom of religion, the ECHR will assess whether the
measure is necessary in a democratic society.202 This necessity analysis
involves two steps. First, the ECHR will assess whether the ban is proportional
to its stated aims of promoting gender equality and public safety.203 This
Comment suggests that the ECHR adopt the tripartite test articulated by Dr.
Gunn to objectively analyze the ban’s proportionality to these aims.204 Second,
the ECHR will decide whether to widen or narrow the margin of appreciation
granted to France, which is a decision that heavily influences the final
determination of whether the infringement is necessary in a democratic
society.205
1. The Burqa Ban Is Not Proportional to the Aim of Promoting Gender
Equality
If a petition were to be heard by the ECHR, France would likely cite the
promotion of gender equality as a legitimate aim of the ban, as the French
government has cited this defense on several occasions. In the introduction to
the Parliamentary Commission’s Report, André Gerin, president of the
commission, wrote:
[T]he wearing of the full veil infringes upon three principles that are
included in the motto of the Republic: liberty, equality and fraternity.
The full veil is an intolerable infringement on the freedom and the
dignity of women. It is the denial of gender equality and of a mixed

Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8 (relying on expert testimony for statistics). This Comment,
thus, assumes that women in France wear niqabs as a manifestation of religion.
201 See Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R at 196–97.
202 Id at 201–08.
203 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 66, at 599; see also Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
The ECHR will likely also analyze whether the burqa ban is proportional to its aim of eliminating a hindrance
upon social interactions. This Comment, however, does not analyze this aim.
204 See discussion supra Part II.B.
205 See Gunn, supra note 22, at 468.
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society. Finally, it is the will to exclude women from social life and
206
the rejection of our common will to live together.

Additionally, in an op-ed in The New York Times, Jean François Copé, the
majority leader of the French National Assembly, defended the ban by
characterizing the veil as “a blow against the dignity of women,”207 and
President Sarkozy, during his June 2009 address to parliament, characterized
the veil as “a sign of subservience.”208
If France were to cite this justification—that the veil is representative of the
unequal treatment of women—it is likely that the ECHR will find that the
promotion of gender equality is a legitimate aim.209 In Dahlab, the ECHR
characterized the wearing of the headscarf as “hard to square with the principle
of gender equality,” and thus found that a Swiss measure restricting the
wearing of the headscarf was justified.210 Additionally, France has shown its
commitment to the promotion of gender equality by undergoing two
constitutional reviews on this basis: one on the equal access of both genders to
electoral mandates and offices, and one on professional and social
responsibility.211 Perhaps most significantly, the ECHR has never struck down
legislation based upon its belief that a limitation does not pursue legitimate
aims.212
While it is likely that the ECHR will find that France’s purported aim of
promoting gender equality is legitimate, the burqa ban is not proportional to
the aim pursued. The lack of proportionality is apparent when applying the
tripartite proportionality requirements to the ban. The ban does not satisfy any
of the three articulated criteria: it does not have the theoretical capacity to
reach its goal of promoting gender equality, it is not necessary to promote
equality, and the burden is excessive compared to the aim.

206

Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8 (translating Rapport No. 2262, supra note 69, at 13).
Copé, supra note 7.
208 Burqas ‘Not Welcome,’ supra note 67.
209 See Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 456 (noting that “the principle of gender
equality . . . is a fundamental value”).
210 Id. at 463.
211 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 22.
212 Kamal, supra note 24, at 679.
207
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a. The Burqa Ban Does Not Have Theoretical Capacity To Promote
Gender Equality
According to the tripartite proportionality criteria, the burqa ban must have
the potential to promote equality between genders.213 The burqa ban, however,
cannot satisfy this criterion. The French government passed the law under the
assumption that the burqa, niqab, and sitar represent inequality and are worn as
a result of oppression,214 but France’s judgment on this issue may not be
correct. This argument is based on speculation; France has not gathered data
regarding how many women are forced to wear the veil and how many women
choose to wear the veil. Without these statistics, it cannot be assumed that
removing the veil from the public sphere will promote equality for anyone
because, for all France knows, each woman who wears a full veil may do so
out of choice.
Further, banning the burqa, niqab, and sitar may remove a perceived
symbol of gender inequality from the public sphere, but the burqa ban is a
superficial measure that does little to assist the women who wear full veils.
Some French women choose to wear a face-covering veil, whether based on
religious beliefs or a desire to comply with Muslim tradition; for these women,
the burqa ban restricts their freedom of religion while doing nothing to
promote their well-being.
The burqa ban’s potential to restrict freedom is well demonstrated by the
story of Faiza Silmi, who was denied French citizenship after a government
commissioner reported to the Counsel of State that Silmi wore the niqab at her
husband’s request and that “[s]he lives in total submission to her male
relatives.”215 The report further stated that Silmi “seems to find this [treatment]
normal, and the idea of challenging it has never crossed her mind.”216 Contrary
to the official’s report, Silmi wears the niqab out of religious conviction.217
Apart from choosing to wear a niqab for religious reasons, Silmi also wears the
niqab because she wants to dress modestly; she does not find the traditional
Moroccan djelaba to be modest enough, and decided to wear the niqab instead
213 See Gunn, supra note 22, at 467 (explaining that a restrictive measure is proportional according to
ECHR analysis only if it has the theoretical capacity to accomplish its goal).
214 French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, supra note 86.
215 Bennhold, supra note 53 (internal quotation mark omitted); accord France and Islam: A Burqa
Barrier, supra note 127 (recounting the same facts, using “Faiza M.” to identify Silmi).
216 Bennhold, supra note 53 (internal quotation mark omitted).
217 France Closer to Banning Full Veil, supra note 197 (noting that Silmi began to wear the veil after she
“discovered a deepening of [her] faith”).
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so that she could avoid “men’s looks.”218 Before France passed the burqa ban,
Silmi was free to leave her house wearing the garment of her choice: the niqab.
With the passage of the ban, her freedom to wear the niqab, and to manifest her
religion in the manner of her choosing, is gone. In other words, for those
women in France who, like Silmi, choose to wear the niqab based on their own
personal choice, the burqa ban operates as a paternalist measure that,
ironically, suppresses their freedom instead of vindicating their rights.
For those women in France who do not choose to wear the veil but are
forced to do so, there is no evidence pointing to the fact that their condition
will actually improve because of the burqa ban. Islam, in a traditional sense,
condones “[s]ocial inequality and the obedience of women.”219 Those men who
are traditional enough to force their wife to wear a burqa or niqab are also
more likely to be violent: “The more traditional the gender roles and male
dominance over women, the more likely violence against women is observed
and condoned . . . [C]ultures with more traditional, patriarchal attitudes and
more extreme conditions of subordination of women generate more severe and
frequent violence against women.”220 Logically, men who previously forced
women to cover themselves in public because of traditional views could
respond to their wives’ inability to wear a veil with violence or, in the
alternative, could now force their wives to stay at home; rather than being
confined in the “prison” of their niqabs,221 women could effectively be
confined in the prison of their homes.222
Notably, banning the wearing of the burqa, niqab, and sitar in the public
sphere does not have the same effect upon public opinion regarding gender
roles as did the banning of the headscarf in Şahin, Dahlab, and Dogru. Each of
these cases involved restrictions within a public school setting, rather than in
all public spaces generally. In these decisions, the ECHR emphasized that the
wearing of the headscarf in public schools had the potential to considerably
influence young minds. In Dahlab, the applicant who wanted to wear the
headscarf was a public school teacher, and the ECHR explained that:

218

Bennhold, supra note 53 (internal quotation mark omitted).
DAVID GHANIM, GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 55 (2009).
220 ANDREA PARROT & NINA CUMMINGS, FORSAKEN FEMALES: THE GLOBAL BRUTALIZATION OF WOMEN
19 (2006) (citations omitted).
221 Bennhold, supra note 53 (“Fadela Amara, the French minister for urban affairs, called Ms. Silmi’s
niqab ‘a prison’ and a ‘straitjacket.’”); France Votes To Ban Full-Face Veils, supra note 5.
222 France Closer to Banning Full Veil, supra note 197 (discussing a nineteen-year-old convert who
expressed fear that she would not be able to leave the house after the passage of the burqa ban).
219
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The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, a period
during which children wonder about many things and are also more
easily influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot
be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some
kind of proselytising effect . . . . It therefore appears difficult to
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and nondiscrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey
223
to their pupils.

In contrast, the burqa ban does not address a situation where the people
prohibited from manifesting their beliefs are in positions of exerting strong
influence on children. Rather, the ban prohibits regular citizens from wearing
religious garb in virtually any public forum.224 This distinction is important; it
is unlikely that one could argue as successfully, as was done in ECHR
precedent, that the ban has the theoretical capacity to promote gender equality
due to the garb’s influence on third-person views of appropriate gender roles.
In sum, the ban fails in satisfying the tripartite test’s first proportionality
criteria; it does not improve the status of the women wearing the veil and is
unlikely to affect people’s views regarding the status of women.
b. The Burqa Ban Is Not Necessary To Promote Gender Equality
According to the proportionality criteria articulated by Dr. Gunn, the burqa
ban must also be more than merely suitable for promoting gender equality—it
must be necessary.225 To be necessary, the burqa ban should be the least
restrictive alternative to promote gender equality.226 Similar to the ban’s failure
to satisfy the first criterion, the burqa ban is not the least restrictive alternative
means to promote gender equality among France’s Muslim population, and
thus fails to meet the second criterion as well.
The Parliamentary Commission’s Report suggested less restrictive
alternatives that could have been implemented to promote gender equality in
France instead of the burqa ban.227 These recommendations include the
following:

223

Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463.
See Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
225 See Gunn, supra note 22, at 467 (explaining that a restrictive measure may not be proportional if there
are less restrictive alternatives to achieving the aim).
226 See id.
227 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
224
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conducting mediation with women wearing the veil and their families
to better understand their motivations;
notifying the competent authorities of any minor wearing the full
veil, within the framework of the protection of minors in danger;
reinforcing civic education, in particular the teaching of gender
equality . . . [and]
introducing legislation that would make psychological violence
228
between a couple a criminal offense.

Each of these recommendations constitutes a lesser infringement upon freedom
of religion, and arguably more directly addresses the gender inequality
problems associated with the veil. If, in place of instituting a burqa ban, France
began to conduct mediations with women who wear the veil, French
authorities could better assess whether an individual was wearing the veil as a
result of her personal religious conviction or as a result of pressure from her
husband, father, or religious leader. If the authorities found that a woman was
wearing a veil because of oppression, France could offer counseling to the
woman forced into second-class gender status. Counseling and mediation
could help oppressed women without infringing upon the religious freedom of
women who choose to wear the veil.
Similarly, notifying authorities of minors who wear the veil, along with
emphasizing gender equality in schools, helps ensure that children are not
forced to wear a full veil before they are old enough to understand its
significance. Finally, if France introduced legislation that criminalized
psychological violence between couples, men would theoretically be less
inclined to force their wives to wear the veil, or to engage in other practices
associated with Islam that degrade women. Because each of these alternatives
qualifies as a less restrictive means to promote gender equality in France, the
burqa ban is unnecessary, and thus fails the second proportionality criterion as
well.
c. The Burden Is Arguably Excessive Relative to the Aim of Promoting
Gender Equality
Finally, the tripartite proportionality test requires that “the measure . . . [is]
proportionate to the objective,” meaning that “[t]he burden must not be

228

Id.
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excessive relative to the objective.”229 Several factors suggest that the
infringement upon women’s right to manifest religion is quite limited. First,
the ban prevents a seemingly small proportion of France’s Muslim population
from wearing the niqab—approximately 2,000 women in a population of six
million Muslims.230 Second, the women who previously wore the niqab or
burqa could wear alternate forms of religious garb, such as the headscarf and
the chador, while out in public. In other words, like the applicant in Şahin,
French Muslims are free to observe other aspects of their religion, despite
being prohibited from wearing full veils.231 Though these factors weigh in
favor of the ECHR finding that the burqa ban is not excessive relative to its
aim, the ban is over-inclusive and does not address gender equality enough to
warrant a complete ban on a type of religious garb. Thus, the burden imposed
by the burqa ban is excessive in relation to the aim of promoting gender
equality.
Before banning women from wearing face-covering veils, the French
government did not assess how many women wear the niqab out of their own
personal choice or how many women wear it as a result of patriarchal pressure.
However, a study cited by the Parliamentary Commission’s Report states that
one-fourth of the women who wear the niqab are converts to Islam,232 which
suggests that these women chose the Muslim religion and the practices
associated with it. Thus, at least one-fourth of the women who wear the niqab
likely do so out of choice. The ban prevents these women, and others who
choose to wear the full veil, from manifesting their religion in the way they
choose. Therefore, the ban is over-inclusive; it infringes upon the freedom of
women who choose to wear the veil without assisting them. In fact, the burqa
ban may worsen their condition; it replaces the choice that these women were
previously allowed to exercise with oppression from the French government.
Additionally, a comparison between the burqa ban’s doubtful effect on the
gender status of women233 and the significant infringement on freedom of
religion highlights the excessiveness of the burden. The ban lacks the
theoretical capacity to improve gender equality of the women who wear full
veils, regardless of whether they do so out of choice or pressure, but the
229

Gunn, supra note 22, at 468 (emphasis omitted).
Erlanger, supra note 6.
231 In deciding that the infringement was proportionate in Şahin, the ECHR stressed that Muslim students
were still free to observe their religion. Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 207.
232 Highlights of Parliamentary Report, supra note 8.
233 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.c.
230

NANWANI GALLEYSFINAL

1464

2/28/2012 9:03 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

government is imposing criminal sanctions for wearing full veils in any public
space anyway. The burden of an infringement is clearly excessive in cases
where the measure does not even address the legitimate aim.
By claiming that the burqa ban promotes gender equality, France is using
speculation to justify a significant infringement upon religious freedom. France
defends the ban by stating that women wear face-covering veils because they
are oppressed, but it has not gathered the necessary data as support. Applying
the tripartite criteria to the burqa ban’s aim of promoting gender equality
clearly demonstrates that the ban is not proportionate to its stated aim. Thus,
the ban is unnecessary, based upon its gender equality goal.
2. The Burqa Ban Is Not Proportional to the Aim of Promoting Public
Safety
The French government has also defended the burqa ban by asserting that
the elimination of face-covering veils from French streets contributes to public
safety. The public safety argument asserted most often is that the wearing of
the burqa, niqab, or sitar hinders identification of the individual wearing it,
easily allowing someone wearing a face-covering veil to anonymously commit
a criminal act.234 This justification was proffered by Jean Francis Copé, who
compared women in veils to criminals in ski masks. Copé described the burqa
as “a mask worn at all times, making identification . . . virtually impossible.”235
As “confirmation” of the safety problems caused by the burqa, Copé pointed to
a recent armed robbery committed in a Parisian suburb by criminals dressed in
burqas.236
234 See, e.g., Copé, supra note 7. A second proffered public safety defense that is not analyzed in this
Comment is that the long flowing robes worn along with face-covering veils can potentially serve as hiding
places for weapons or bombs. See Aidan Radnedge, Woman Threatens France with Suicide Bomb Attack After
Burka Ban, METRO (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.metro.co.uk/news/841510-woman-threatens-france-withsuicide-bomb-attack-after-burka-ban. People dressed in burqas have carried out suicide bombings in several
countries where face-covering veils are prevalent, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. See, e.g., Isambard
Wilkinson & Emal Khan, Taliban Suicide Bombers Dressed in Burkas Hit Cities, TELEGRAPH (July 21, 2009,
3:19 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5878787/Taliban-suicide-bombersdressed-in-burkas-hit-cities.html. While several of these suicide bombers have been males disguised in burqas,
women have begun to carry out attacks as well. For example, on December 25, 2010, a Pakistani woman,
dressed in a head-to-toe burqa, carried out a suicide bombing in Pakistan after being challenged at a police
checkpoint. Associated Press, Burqa-Clad Suicide Bomber Kills Dozens at Food Aid Center, FRANCE 24,
http://www.france24.com/en/20101225-burqa-clad-suicide-bomber-kills-dozens-pakistani-aid-center
(last
updated Dec. 25, 2010). The attack, which killed forty-five people and left more than 100 wounded, marked
Pakistan’s first suicide bombing by a female. Id.
235 Copé, supra note 7.
236 Id.
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If France does proffer public safety as an aim of the ban, it is likely that the
ECHR will find that this aim is legitimate. The ECHR has never struck down
legislation based upon the belief that an aim of the restriction is illegitimate.237
Further, the ECHR has recognized public safety as an important concern of
nation-states and is hesitant to interfere in public safety areas.238 While the aim
of promoting national security is likely legitimate, the ECHR should recognize
that the means employed, the burqa ban, is not proportionate to the aim
pursued. The lack of proportionality is apparent when applying the tripartite
test articulated by Dr. Gunn to the public safety defense; while the ban has the
theoretical capacity to achieve its safety aim, it is not necessary to achieve its
intended purpose and the burden caused by the ban is excessive relative to its
objective. Because the ban satisfies only one of the three requirements, the ban
lacks proportionality and is not necessary in a democratic society, based upon
the public safety justification.
a. The Burqa Ban Has the Theoretical Capacity to Improve Identity
Control
The burqa ban would prohibit women from wearing face-covering veils
while in public spaces.239 Logically, this prohibition has the theoretical
capacity to improve France’s ability to identify the individuals who wear the
veil on a daily basis. The burqa ban thus satisfies Dr. Gunn’s first
proportionality criterion. However, it fails to satisfy the other two
requirements.
b. The Burqa Ban Is Not Necessary To Achieve Identity Control in
France
The burqa ban is not necessary to achieve its intended purpose because less
restrictive alternatives exist to improve means of identification in France, many
of which have already been instituted.240 The Council of State emphasized this
point in its report, where it noted that “[t]he wearing of the full veil . . . is
already prohibited or provided for under certain provisions.”241
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Kamal, supra note 24, at 679.
Brauch, supra note 159, at 116.
239 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law
2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010 Banning the Concealment of the Face in the Public Space] art. 1, J.O., Oct. 12,
2010, p. 1.
240 See COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 10–15.
241 Id. at 10.
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The Council of State’s report highlights Articles 78-1 and 78-2 of France’s
Code of Criminal Procedure, which, together, serve as means of identity
control in France.242 Article 78-1 states that any person in the country must
submit to an identity check at the request of the proper authorities under a
given set of circumstances.243 Article 78-2 then describes several scenarios
where women wearing face-covering veils would be forced to remove them.244
For example, a police officer may ask any person to verify his identity by any
means where there is reason to suspect that the person has committed or has
attempted to commit an offence, misdemeanor, or felony or where the person
can give information regarding a crime committed by another.245 Additionally,
someone’s identity can be checked to prevent a breach of public order or to
investigate and prosecute terrorist acts.246
The Council of State Report noted the existence of several other scenarios
where identity control measures have been adequately addressed in France.247
For example, a woman could be forced to remove her burqa or niqab as a
condition of entrance when entering a consulate, when going through airport
security, or when using a non-transferable public transportation ticket.248 A
woman could also be forced to remove a garment concealing the face to prove
age if the wearer is trying to enter a drinking establishment or a movie that is
not authorized for all ages.249 Finally, a woman may be asked to remove a veil
for authentication purposes, such as when receiving registered mail from the
post office, obtaining a marriage certification, or voting.250
These measures are adequate. As acknowledged by the Council of State
Report, the identity control measures already in place in France address most,
if not all, identification issues that may come up in the public sphere.251 The
laws in place in France, without the burqa ban, operate to create an
environment where:
in principle a person cannot conceal his face when he/she needs to be
identified in order to guarantee the safety of goods and persons,
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 12.
CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 78-1.
Id. art. 78-2.
Id.
Id. arts. 78-2, 78-2-2.
COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 12–13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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prevent or prosecute infringements of the law, and more generally
ensure respect for legal and regulatory provisions that make access to
252
goods and services dependent upon personal attributes.

Because people are already legally required to remove face-covering veils in
such an array of circumstances, it is difficult to accept the argument that the
burqa ban is necessary to improve identification control in France.
c. The Burqa Ban’s Burden Is Excessive Relative to its Objective
Finally, the burqa ban is disproportionate to its identification goal because
it applies to all public spaces, which is a term that the bill defines broadly.253
While it is sometimes necessary to identify an individual for security purposes,
prohibiting a woman from wearing the religious garb of her choice in scenarios
apart from those already addressed by existing French legislation is an
excessive burden compared to the speculative, marginal improvement in
security that may result.
In an effort to show that the institution of the ban would improve security,
Jean Francis Copé pointed to an armed robbery committed by criminals
disguised in burqas.254 Copé asserted that the ban was a means of addressing
such situations “without waiting for the phenomenon to spread.”255 However,
any fear of the “phenomenon” spreading is largely speculative; the armed
robbery that Copé mentioned was the first of its kind in France and, as of the
date of this writing, no other burqa-disguised criminals have followed suit.256
The possible danger caused by allowing face-covering veils to be worn in a
public sphere is unproven and “restrictions on rights and liberties must be
justified by an actual threat . . . or the sufficiently strong likelihood of one.”257
Even the Council of State noted an unwillingness “to accept that a virtual or
unproven risk . . . might justify a prohibition.”258
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Id.
Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law
2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010 Banning the Concealment of the Face in the Public Space] art. 1, J.O., Oct. 12,
2010, p. 1.
254 Copé, supra note 7.
255 Id.
256 Barry Duke, Villains Find Burqas the Perfect Disguise, FREETHINKER (Feb. 7, 2010), http://
freethinker.co.uk/2010/02/07/villians-find-burqas-the-perfect-disguise.
257 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 33.
258 Id.
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Notably, the burden that accompanies the burqa ban is more excessive than
those imposed in ECHR precedent. The Article 9 cases, Şahin, Dahlab, and
Dogru, were all much narrower in their application. In Şahin, the restriction
applied in a university setting; students were prohibited from “wear[ing]
clothes that symbolise or manifest any religion, faith, race, or political or
ideological persuasion in any institution or department of the university, or on
any of its premises.”259 Even narrower, in Dahlab, the interference with
religious freedom restricted a public school teacher from “wearing a headscarf
in the performance of her [professional] duties.”260 Finally, the restriction in
Dogru was narrowest: it applied to a physical education class in a secondary
school.261 In stark contrast, this ban applies to all public spaces, apart from
places of worship, regardless of whether the place has a connection to any
possible safety problem.
If one weighs the identification interest in the limitation versus the
interference with religion, the result is clear: the danger that the burqa ban
addresses is both minimal and speculative, while the burden imposed on
people who would like to observe their religion by wearing face-covering veils
is large. The scale tips very heavily toward the burqa ban being
disproportionate to its public safety goal.
3. Margin of Appreciation
While the tripartite test indicates that the burqa ban is not proportional to its
two main justifications, ECHR decisions are based less on proportionality than
they are on “how far [the court] is prepared to defer to the choices of the
authority that has adopted the measure at issue.”262 In other words, the ECHR’s
decision regarding the necessity of the ban will be heavily influenced by its
determination regarding the margin of appreciation, or the extent of deference,
that should be granted to France.263 The ECHR can either choose to narrow the
margin of appreciation, which means France will face stricter scrutiny, or
widen it, which would likely lead to a ratification of the state action.264 It is

259

Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 190.
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur, Ct. H.R. 448, 457.
261 Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow
“Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case Title”
box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box).
262 Gunn, supra note 22, at 468 (internal quotations marks omitted).
263 See id. at 468, 487.
264 Brauch, supra note 159, at 126–28; Gunn, supra note 22, at 486.
260
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difficult to predict the extent of deference that the ECHR will grant France
because the ECHR has had “widely varying approaches” and has “provide[d]
only limited guidance on this issue.” 265
While ECHR precedent has done little to articulate guidelines, the ECHR
has engaged in two telling practices when determining the extent of deference
it should grant.266 First, the ECHR has employed interest balancing, where it
weighs the right infringed upon against the importance of the restriction.267
This interest weighing has led to several trends,268 most of which are unhelpful
in the context of the burqa ban. Second, the ECHR has taken into account the
“existence of a European consensus on the matter before the Court.”269 This
Comment applies both of these ECHR practices to the burqa ban to analyze the
margin of appreciation that France should receive.
a. Interest Weighing and the Trends That Result
In weighing interests, the ECHR has identified several trends that can either
widen or narrow the margin of appreciation. One trend is that the ECHR
traditionally adjusts the margin of appreciation granted to nation-states to
condone state actions that promote secular ideals.270
Şahin, Dahlab, and Dogru are examples of cases where the ECHR granted
wide margins of appreciation to promote secularism.271 In Şahin, the ECHR
determined that Turkey should receive a wide margin of appreciation and
placed heavy importance on Turkey’s cultural and constitutional norm of
secularism in doing so.272 The court emphasized that “[t]he Turkish Republic
265 Gunn, supra note 22, at 485–86. Because of the ECHR’s widely varying approaches, some critique the
court’s application of the margin of appreciation and call for its abolishment. As ECHR Judge De Meyer put it:
“The empty phrases concerning the State’s margin of appreciation—repeated in the Court’s judgments for too
long already—are unnecessary circumlocutions, serving only to indicate abstrusely that the States may do
anything the Court does not consider incompatible with human rights.” Brauch, supra note 159, at 148
(quoting Z v. Finland, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 323, 358 (De Meyer, J., dissenting)).
266 Brauch, supra note 159, at 126–29.
267 Id. at 127–28.
268 See id.
269 Id.
270 Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–5 (2008) http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow
“Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case Title”
box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box); Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 185–86;
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur, Ct. H.R. 448, 461.
271 Dogru, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–5; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 185–86; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at
460–62.
272 Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 185–86.
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was founded on the principle that the State should be secular” and that wearing
the Islamic headscarf to school was only a “recent phenomenon” that the
“supporters of secularism . . . see . . . as a symbol of political Islam.”273 The
Şahin court also noted that securing “true religious pluralism . . . is vital to the
survival of a democratic society.”274 Similarly, in Dogru, the ECHR stressed
the French constitutional principle of secularism in its decision, explaining that
the protection of secularism is of “prime importance” and that “[h]aving regard
to the margin of appreciation . . . religious freedom thus recognised and
restricted by the requirements of secularism appears legitimate in the light of
the values underpinning the Convention.”275 Finally, in Dahlab, the ECHR
explained, “it may be necessary to place restrictions on [religious] freedom in
order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s
beliefs are respected.”276
Because the burqa ban is similar to the state actions in Şahin, Dahlab, and
Dogru, in that the ban originated as a mode of promoting secular ideals in
France,277 one could easily assume that the ECHR would adjust the margin of
appreciation to condone the ban, meaning that the ECHR would widen
France’s margin of appreciation. However, the ECHR trend of adjusting the
margin of appreciation to promote secularism will likely not apply in the
context of the burqa ban for three reasons.
First, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR recently moved away from the
trend of adjusting the margin of appreciation in favor of secularism, indicating
that secularism may not warrant as wide of a margin of appreciation as it once
did.278 Lautsi v. Italy involved Italy’s policy of hanging crucifixes in public
schools.279 The lower court originally narrowed the margin of appreciation
granted to Italy, a nation-state with a religious establishment, so as not to
impose Christianity upon non-believers.280 However, on March 18, 2011, the
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Id.
Id. at 204.
275 Dogru, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19–20.
276 Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 461.
277 See Burqas ‘Not Welcome,’ supra note 67; Crumley, supra note 108.
278 See generally Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “2011” in the “Text”
box, “Lautsi” in the “Case Title” box, and “Italy” in the “Respondent State” box). However, it is important to
note that Lautsi is distinguishable because it involves Italy, a nation with a traditional religious establishment,
see id. at 28, while France is historically secular, see discussion supra Part I.C.
279 Lautsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–4.
280 See id. at 15.
274
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Grand Chamber overruled the lower court’s decision; it widened the margin of
appreciation granted to Italy281 and held that the display of crucifixes in public
schools does not violate Article 9.282 Specifically, the Lautsi court explained
that, while crucifixes are associated with Christianity,283 displaying such a
religious symbol does not amount to indoctrination and “could not in itself be
viewed as a departure from the principles of pluralism and objectivity.”284 The
court emphasized that a crucifix is a “passive” religious symbol that could not
“be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic
speech or participation in religious activities.”285 Thus, the display of
crucifixes was compatible with ideals of secularism.
Second, the burqa ban is distinct from the state actions in Şahin, Dahlab,
and Dogru because the burqa ban is far more expansive. Şahin, Dahlab, and
Dogru applied strictly in school settings, and it is widely acknowledged that
the state has more freedom to restrict freedom of religion within public
institutions than in public spaces generally.286 In Dahlab, for example, the
ECHR accepted the Swiss government’s argument that it should be granted a
wide margin of appreciation in restricting the petitioner’s religious freedom
because the petitioner was a teacher, and was thus “bound to the State by a
special status.”287 The Council of State also acknowledged the difference
between bans in public institutions and general bans, noting that secularism
“mainly applies in relations between the public authorities and religions or
persons who subscribe to them. It is directly binding on public institutions,
thereby justifying the neutrality requirement imposed.”288 Secularism,
however, accords less authority on a nation to restrict religious freedom
outside of public institutions.289 Because France has prohibited veiling in all
public spaces generally, rather than in schools or public offices, the ECHR
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See id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
283 Id. at 29.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 29.
286 See, e.g., Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case
Title” box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box); COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 20.
287 Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 459.
288 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 20.
289 See id. In France specifically, the State has more latitude to promote secularism in public offices and in
schools than elsewhere. See id. This greater grant of power in the public sphere complies with the original
purpose of laïcité, which was to limit the influence of the Catholic Church in public schools. Crumley, supra
note 108.
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should not automatically grant France a wide margin of appreciation in
observance of the nation’s secular culture.
Third, it is unlikely that France would even defend the burqa ban by
articulating its secular philosophy; thus, the ECHR would have no reason to
adjust the margin granted based on secular ideals. Before the French
Parliament passed the burqa ban, the Council of State warned French
legislators that secularism was a shaky ground on which to base a general
prohibition on the veil: “secularism could not provide the basis for a general
restriction on the expression of religious convictions in the public
space . . . and could therefore not be a ground for imposing a total ban on the
full veil throughout the public space.”290 Notably, the Council of State also
noted that, in Arslan v. Turkey,291 the ECHR had already acknowledged that
secularism could not form a basis for a general ban.292 Due to these three
reasons, the secular origin of the burqa ban reveals little about how the ECHR
would adjust the margin of appreciation granted to France.
Another margin of appreciation trend that may be helpful in analyzing the
ban is that the ECHR has generally granted European nations wide margins of
appreciation where the nation’s restriction pursues the aim of public safety or
promoting morality.293 Because two of the burqa ban’s main defenses are that
the ban promotes public safety and equality of women, it is possible that the
ECHR will assign a wide margin of appreciation to France and thus condone
the burqa ban regardless of its proportionality flaws. However, the ECHR has
also generally applied a narrow margin of appreciation in cases that restrict
citizens’ core freedoms.294 The ECHR has acknowledged the importance of
one’s religious freedom,295 and thus it is also possible that the ECHR will grant
a narrow margin of appreciation to France and find that the ban falls outside of
the narrow margin. In other words, the burqa ban implicates competing
interests, which, again, reveals little about the extent of the margin that the
ECHR is likely to grant.296
290

COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 20.
Arslan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow “CaseLaw” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Arslan” in the “Case Title” box,
“Turkey” in the “Respondent State” box, and “41135” in the “Application Number” box).
292 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 20.
293 Brauch, supra note 159, at 127.
294 See id. (noting the court narrowed the margin of appreciation in the Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1982), which dealt with personal autonomy, and in another case dealing with freedom of speech).
295 See Gunn, supra note 22, at 492 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 17 (1993)).
296 Brauch, supra note 159, at 133.
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b. The European Consensus
In cases where interest-weighing reveals little, “the key factor for [ECHR]
analysis is likely to be the existence of a European consensus. . . . ‘This factor
[is] an essential standard which anchors the scope of supervision.’”297 As of the
date of this writing, Belgium is the only European country that has instituted a
general burqa ban as extensive as that of France.298 As the Council of State
report notes, a few countries that are not comparable to France, such as
Singapore and Tunisia, have instituted general bans on the full veil.299 In
addition, several countries, such as Italy and Denmark, considered general bans
and condemned the practice of wearing veils, but have not adopted a
resolution; Denmark, specifically, did not adopt its resolution “notably for
legal reasons.”300 The lack of similar legislation in other European countries
should lead the ECHR to grant a narrower margin of appreciation for France.
The ECHR, however, may consider the public debate surrounding the practice
of wearing veils, as well as other European countries’ considerations of
passing a general ban, as evidence of a European consensus, and thus widen
the margin accordingly.
c. A Difficult Margin To Predict
Interest-weighing and accounting for a European consensus are the two
most identifiable factors used to predict the margin of appreciation, and both
can be easily skewed to change the margin of appreciation granted to France;
“the margin of appreciation varies not only in relation to different exceptions,
but in relation to the same exception in different contexts.”301 All in all, the
margin of appreciation serves as a mode to allow states to “do anything the
Court does not consider incompatible with human rights.”302 One could hope
that the ECHR notes the burqa ban’s extreme incompatibility with human
rights—the burqa ban is objectively disproportionate to its aim, discriminates
against Muslims, and severely infringes upon religious freedom. If the ECHR
297 Id. at 138 (quoting HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 195 (1996)).
298 Belgian Burqa Ban Comes into Force, RIA NOVOSTI (July 23, 2011), http://en.rian.ru/news/20110723/
165346750.html.
299 COUNCIL OF STATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 17.
300 Id.
301 Brauch, supra note 159, at 129 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Aileen McHarg, Reconciling Human
Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, 62 MOD. L. REV. 671, 688 (1999)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
302 Id. at 126 (quoting Z v. Finland, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 323, 358 (De Meyer, J., dissenting)).
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chooses to acknowledge the obvious incompatibility of the burqa ban with
human rights, it will likely narrow the margin of appreciation accordingly.303
CONCLUSION
When a case challenging the burqa ban is brought to the ECHR, the ECHR
will first conclude that the ban is an interference with freedom of religion. It
will then analyze whether the ban is necessary in a democratic society and thus
complies with Article 9 of the European Convention by assessing: (1) whether
the ban is proportional to its stated aims,304 and (2) how wide the margin of
appreciation granted to France should be.305 While this analysis will surely
occur, the result of the analysis is unpredictable, as the ECHR has not provided
clear guidelines on proportionality or the margin of appreciation.306
This Comment suggests that the ECHR adopt a widely accepted, tripartite
proportionality test to provide clarity and predictability to the proportionality
inquiry. Applying the tripartite test demonstrates that, when analyzed with
objective criteria, the burqa ban is disproportionate to both of its stated aims of
promoting gender equality and promoting public safety. France’s
parliamentary report put forth data in support of the ban but, even with the
data, France’s assertion that the ban is necessary to promote either of these
aims is largely speculative.307 At most, the burqa ban can possibly help women
who wear the veil as a result of oppression and can possibly lead to a marginal
improvement in public safety. However, these possibilities are not enough to
justify the ban’s excessive infringement upon freedom of religion.
The ECHR should recognize that the burqa ban is not proportional to the
promotion of women’s rights: the ban does not improve women’s status in
society, it is an overly restrictive measure, and the burden imposed is excessive
compared to its aim.308 By instituting the burqa ban, France has not helped the
women who wear the veil, regardless of whether women wear the veil out of
choice or oppression. Prohibiting face-covering veils in the public sphere does
not get to the root of gender inequality in Islam. Rather, it superficially
addresses the problem by removing a symbol of inequality from French streets.
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Though several less restrictive alternatives exist that could address the gender
issues associated with veiling, France adopted a measure that severely
infringes upon religious freedom without solving any problems.309
The ECHR should further recognize that the burqa ban is disproportionate
to France’s second goal of improving public safety; the danger associated with
the inability to identify people wearing full veils has been addressed largely
through existing legislation, and any additional risk that results from allowing
veils in public spaces is unproven.310 Copé, in his defense of the ban, pointed
to a single crime committed by a burglar disguised in a burqa.311 One crime,
however, is insignificant when compared to the excessive burden imposed on
all of the women who wear the veil as a manifestation of religion. Even the
Council of State acknowledged that “a virtual or unproven risk” was not
enough to warrant a prohibition.312
In adjusting the margin of appreciation granted to France, the ECHR
should acknowledge the burqa ban’s extreme flaws in proportionality, as well
as its overall incompatibility with human rights. If the ECHR ignores the burqa
ban’s significant failings and grants a wide margin of appreciation, as it did in
Şahin, Dahlab, and Dogru, the ECHR risks allowing the margin of
appreciation to swallow the fundamental right of freedom of religion,
guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention. In past efforts to be
deferential to the member states of the European Convention, the ECHR
condoned significant infringements on freedom of religion. But, at some point,
the court should draw the line. The burqa ban, with its extensive application
within France and potential influence on other nation-states planning to ban
full veils, is an ideal line-drawing opportunity for the ECHR.
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